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Registro 11 de 15
Clasificación:
320.53 S969
Título:
The politics of authoritarian rule. --
Imp / Ed.:
Cambridge, UK, Gran Bretaña : Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Descripción:
xviii, 228 p. : il. ; 24 cm.
Serie:
Cambridge studies in comparative politics
Contenido:
Figures. -- Tables. -- Acknowledgements. -- 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship. -- 2. The world of authoritarian politics. -- Part I: The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing. -- 3. And then there was one! Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship. -- 4. When and why institutions contribute to authoritarian stability: commitment, monitoring, and collective action problems in authoritarian power-sharing. -- Part II. The Problem of Authoritarian Control. -- 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships. -- 6. Why authoritarian parties? The regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control. -- 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics. -- Bibliography. -- Index. --
Resumen:
Tomado del contenido: "What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues that all authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. First, dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule this is the problem of authoritarian control. A second, separate, challenge arises from the elites with whom dictators rule - this is the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Crucially, whether and how dictators resolve these two problems are shaped by the dismal environment in which authoritarian politics takes place: in a dictatorship, no independent authority has the power to enforce agreements among key actors and violence is the ultimate arbiter of conflicts. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators, like Saddam Hussein, establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why leadership changes elsewhere are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some authoritarian regimes are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many dictatorships, like PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. When assessing his arguments, Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis of comprehensive original data on institutions, leaders, and ruling coalitions across all dictatorships from 1946 to 2008."
ISBN:
9781107607453

Ubicación de copias:

Ludwig von Mises - Ver mapa: Exhibición primer nivel - Tiempo de préstamo: 15 días - Item: 541366 - (DISPONIBLE)