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Registro 19 de 499
Clasificación:
321.07 L487
Título:
Anarchy unbound : why self-governance works better than you think. --
Imp / Ed.:
New York, NY, Estados Unidos : Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Descripción:
xi, 256 p. ; 24 cm.
Serie:
Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society.
Contenido:
1.Part I: Anarchy unbound. -- Part II: Self-governance and the problem of violence. -- Part IV. Self-governance as superior to the state. --
Resumen:
In Anarchy Unbound, Peter T. Leeson uses rational choice theory to explore the benefits of self-governance. Relying on experience from the past and present, Professor Leeson provides evidence of anarchy "working" where it is least expected to do so and explains how this is possible. Provocatively, Leeson argues that in some cases anarchy may even outperform government as a system of social organization, and demonstrates where this may occur. Anarchy Unbound challenges the conventional self-governance wisdom. It showcases the incredible ingenuity of private individuals to secure social cooperation without government and how their surprising means of doing so can be superior to reliance on the state.
ISBN:
9781107629707
Notas:
Incluye bibliografía e índice p. 227-242

Ubicación de copias:

Ludwig von Mises - Ver mapa: Colección General - Tiempo de préstamo: 15 días - Item: 519594 - (DISPONIBLE)